The Afghans Have a Proverb for It

The Afghans Have a Proverb for It

The 19th cen­tu­ry strug­gle for dom­i­nance in Afghanistan was dubbed “The Great Game’.
The 21st cen­tu­ry ver­sion is look­ing increas­ing­ly like ‘The Grotesque Game’;  summed up neat­ly by an Afghan proverb: “While the butch­ers were argu­ing, the cow dropped dead.”

The tragedy — among many — is that any­one is sur­prised that the rag-tag Tal­iban is ascen­dant and the U.S. and NATO-trained and equipped Afghan forces are either bare­ly hold­ing on, or in retreat.
In his thriller “The Afghan”, Fred­er­ick Forsyth wrote: “There is an apho­rism that you can­not buy the loy­al­ty of an Afghan, but you can always rent it.”
As of 2020 the U.S. alone had spent an esti­mat­ed two TRILLION dol­lars fight­ing the war and shoring up suc­ces­sive Afghan governments.
Much of it dis­ap­peared into “the mas­sive finan­cial malfea­sance, fraud­u­lent con­tracts and a gar­gan­tu­an bank scan­dal that have been the sub­ject of numer­ous U.S. inves­ti­ga­tions of wast­ed and stolen mon­ey in Afghanistan.”
Not what even a com­mit­ted opti­mist would call val­ue for money.

By com­par­i­son, the Tal­iban cuts bar­gain base­ment deals. Sev­er­al dozen pris­on­ers in Badghis province were freed ear­ly July in a jail break the provin­cial gov­er­nor said was facil­i­tat­ed by prison employ­ees who were paid off by the Taliban.
Reports that ‘arrange­ments’ with gov­ern­ment forces allowed the Tal­iban to take dis­tricts with lit­tle to no resis­tance make Forsyth’s apho­rism read more as fact than fiction.

                              A HISTORY OF HORRORS

The U.S. and Britain have accused the Tal­iban of mas­sacring civil­ians and com­mit­ting oth­er atroc­i­ties that may amount to war crimes. Again, why would any­one be surprised?
The most-fre­quent­ly quot­ed lines in Rud­yard Kipling’s 19th cen­tu­ry poem “A Young British Sol­dier” are:
“When you’re wound­ed and left
On Afghanistan’s plains,
And the women come out
To cut up your remains
Just roll on your rifle
And blow out your brains,
And go to your Gawd
Like a soldier.”

A review of The Great Gam­ble: The Sovi­et War in Afghanistan”, (by Gre­go­ry Feifer) not­ed that the muja­hadeen some­times flayed cap­tured Sovi­et sol­diers alive by cut­ting the skin around the belt, yank­ing the loose skin up over the prisoner’s head and tying it off like a pota­to sack. Oth­er reports quote West­ern wit­ness­es as hav­ing seen Sovi­et cap­tives staked out, sliced open and left to die slow­ly in the hot sun.
And the “muj” were “the good guys”, cheered and armed by the West.

It’s become an arti­cle of faith that the only hope for Afghanistan is a peace deal between the Tal­iban and what­ev­er gov­ern­ment remains viable in Kab­ul. Nego­ti­at­ing one remains more wish­ful think­ing than prob­a­bil­i­ty. The Tal­iban aren’t an all-for-one-and-one-for-all entity.

                                     A BRIEF GLIMPSE

 Short­ly after the war began, a small gag­gle of for­eign jour­nal­ists was tak­en across the Pak­istan bor­der to Spin Boldak, where the Tal­iban was born. We were locked into a walled com­pound that looked like a dis­used sports field. Some of our “hosts” were cold to the point of hos­tile, oth­ers bor­der­line friend­ly. One of them, who spoke good Eng­lish, asked if he could use our satel­lite phone to call his cousin, who had a restau­rant in Seat­tle. We often let U.S. sol­diers and refugees call rel­a­tives, so I fig­ured, why not?
The sub­se­quent con­ver­sa­tion was in Pash­tun, and our trans­la­tor wasn’t to hand. I sud­den­ly had seri­ous mis­giv­ings. What if I just hand­ed a Tal­iban the means to pass a code word that would trig­ger a ter­ror­ist operation?
Thank­ful­ly, I was being para­noid. The Tal­ib said his cousin was doing well and loved Amer­i­ca, and he hoped to go and vis­it him when the busi­ness to hand was over. 

                                     FRACTIOUS FACTIONS

Overnight, our hosts split into two fac­tions; one was will­ing to take us on to Khan­da­har, the oth­er want­ed to send us back to Pak­istan. The walls around the com­pound were lined with beard­ed young men squat­ting on their haunch­es, with seem­ing­ly noth­ing bet­ter to do than stare and occa­sion­al­ly toss peb­bles at us. The cou­ple of hours it took to pack up and cross the bor­der were tense, to say the least.
That the Tal­iban is fac­tion­alised is part and par­cel of their being Afghans. The country’s pop­u­la­tion of 38 mil­lion is splin­tered by more than 50 eth­nic or sub-trib­al groups, riv­en and  com­pli­cat­ed by clan­nish rival­ries and feuds.

But that is by no means immutable. The Afghans I was priv­i­leged and pleased to have as col­leagues in the post-inva­sion offices CBS News estab­lished in Kan­da­har and Kab­ul were prime exam­ples of the best Afghan traits. Unfor­tu­nate­ly, it will be no sur­prise if their antithe­sis ends up run­ning the country.

The Afghans have a proverb to sum up that, too: “The world will not find rest by just say­ing ‘peace’.”

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14 thoughts on “The Afghans Have a Proverb for It

  1. Piz- deft­ly writ, as is your habit. My cup run­neth over:
    Kipling, the old saw about rent­ing them for an afternoon
    (which I first heard in the very ear­ly ’60s about the Congolese
    par­lia­ment and the gris­ly details in Gre­go­ry Feifer­’s book–topped by the dead cow say­ing. Your hand has never
    lost its touch. Salute l’artiste. Jon Randal
    jonrandl20o4@yahoo.com

  2. a tal­iban com­man­der told me that his end game was built around the words of sun tzu, author
    of the art of war…
    “there is no instance of a nation ben­e­fit­ting from
    pro­longed warfare”…he added that his group knew Amer­i­ca would even­tu­al­ly grow impatient
    and frus­trat­ed wag­ing a “long war”…
    he thought his crowd would even­tu­al­ly rule
    the coun­try­side and most major provincial
    cities…and then slow­ly strangle
    kab­ul into submission…
    looks as if, eight years ago, he was prescient…

  3. Just read Edmund Richardson’s bril­liant Afghanistan book ‘Alexan­dria the Quest for Lost City’ about the search for Alexan­der the Great’s city in Afghanistan amid the British colo­nial occu­pa­tion in the 1800s. Found at Baghram it seems…Same sto­ry then, shift­ing loy­al­ties. We just don’t learn

  4. as part of my inter­view with the tal­ib commander
    we spent some time com­par­ing the monthly
    costs of main­tain­ing a tal­iban fight­er v an
    Amer­i­can soldier…
    i recall the com­man­der esti­mat­ed a $36 a month
    cost for one of his fight­ers and as I recall, and
    using num­bers from the pen­ta­gon. that was
    many, many hun­dreds per­cent lower…granted
    the Tal­iban “enlist­ed” pop­ulist support…i.e.
    the “shar­ing” of food, live­stock, hous­ing, taxes,
    etc. but the dis­crep­an­cy left open the question
    of how much U.S. mon­ey was being wasted…
    part of that pen­ta­gon num­ber and verified
    by the office of the SIGAR(special investigator
    for afgan relief) went into the pock­ets of corrupt
    mil­i­tary and gov­ern­ment officials…and now we
    have pledged bil­lions more to the same group…
    bet­ter to use that mon­ey to get our afghan friends, trans­la­tors, local con­trac­tors, out of
    har­m’s way…does any­one believe the Taliban
    pledge to play nice with these folks?

  5. How to explain the incred­i­bly rapid tal­iban advance? Rom­mel defined the blirzkrieg but this looks like a col­lapse fore­told. As they used to say: who benefits?

  6. eas­i­ly explained…
    there was nev­er a 300,000 strong afghan nation­al army…
    a good por­tion of this “force” was ghost fighters
    whose salaries went into the pock­ets of corrupt
    mil­i­tary and polit­i­cal leaders…
    those left under­stand­ably lost the will to fight
    for a gov­ern­ment that had aban­doned them…
    and the Amer­i­can with­draw­al fur­ther eroded
    their con­fi­dence and their abil­i­ty to fight…
    it was easy to be “tough” when the world’s
    the might­i­est armory was available…both
    Amer­i­can plan­ners and afghan lead­ers never
    got their heads around just how reliant the
    ANA was on Amer­i­can support…a 20 year his­to­ry should have made this apparent…
    i trem­ble think­ing of the many afghan friends
    allen and I have made as their coun­try stumbles
    into chaos…the answer to “who benefits?”…
    no one, no one at all…

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